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Abstract
Aim In view of increasing concern about a two-class sys-
tem in the German health care sector, this study investigates
the relevance of health insurance schemes and other socio-
economic characteristics to the level of specialist health
care provision.
Subjects and Methods Referring to Ronald M. Andersen’s
model of health care utilization and more content-based
approaches, we implement a negative binomial hurdle
regression to estimate the number of specialist visits within
the last 12 months. Our data source is the German sample
of the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 2004.
Results The results show that men’s number of specialist
visits is markedly sensitive to predisposing and enabling fac-
tors, whereas women’s health care utilization depends less on
such socioeconomic characteristics. With reference to previ-
ous findings concerning general practitioner consultation, the
assumption of a bipolar health care system providing general
practitioner care primarily to the statutory insured and
specialist care to the privately insured is supported empiri-
cally as to men. Education, which is considered to be highly
correlated with health lifestyles, has a positive effect on
medical health care. Every additional year of education
increases by about 10% the probability of men seeking
specialist consultation. Furthermore, the results indicate an
unfavorable situation for the self-employed concerning
health care because of their specific employment situation
and health insurance coverage.
Discussion The research results suggest the existence of
relevant differences in the amount of specialist consultation
according to health insurance and other socioeconomic
features. Further research could concentrate on the question
of whether these inequalities in utilization levels indicate
overprovision or underprovision of ambulant health care.
Moreover, we recommend longitudinal research that is
particularly suited to detangle age and cohort effects.
Keywords Specialist consultation . Health care utilization .
Health insurance . Supply-induced demand . Hurdle
regression
Introduction
The increase of economic incentives and benefit cuts in
statutory health insurance has been accompanied by
concern about a two-class system in the German health
care sector. Qualitatively better care is increasingly associ-
ated with individual resources or access to private health
insurance. In the wider society and the media, responses to
the recently published study of the Institute for Health
Economics at the University of Cologne (Lungen et al.
2008) showed the high sensitivity towards topics con-
cerning the health sector. Lungen et al. illustrated that
patients with statutory health insurance have to wait about
three times longer for an appointment in a specialist
practice than clients of private insurance companies.
Moreover, according to analyses of the Gesundheitsmonitor
S. Gruber
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung,
Regensburger Str. 104, 90478 Nürnberg,
Nuremberg, Germany
e-mail: stefan.gruber@iab.de
M. Kiesel (*)
Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Wiener
Straße/Celsiusstraße,
Postfach 330440, 28334 Bremen, Germany
e-mail: mkiesel@bigsss.uni-bremen.de
J Public Health (2010) 18:351–365
DOI 10.1007/s10389-010-0321-2
(health monitoring) survey, people with statutory health
insurance have shorter talks with their physicians and
consider themselves less informed about their medical
condition as well as less involved in the decision making
about their further treatment compared to privately insured
people (Mielck and Helmert 2007: 62).
By means of the analysis of the contact frequency
between doctor and patient, this study aims to contribute to
the clarification of actually existing differences in specialist
health care provision referring to health insurance and other
socioeconomic characteristics in the German health care
system. Numerous studies in this field use the number of
doctor visits as a key indicator to approximate the amount
of received health services.
Concerning the socioeconomic factors of health care
utilization, most research examines income as the crucial
independent variable. Van Doorslaer et al. (2004a) find that,
after controlling for the greater health care needs of low
income groups, substantial degrees of horizontal inequity
favoring the high income groups emerge in 12 EU member
states collected in the European Community Household
Panel survey of 1996. The pro-rich pattern was strongest in
Ireland and Portugal, and the weakest in the Benelux
countries. Van der Heyden et al. (2003) approve the
positive relation between income and specialist care
utilization in Belgium based on the Belgian Health
Interview Survey of 1997. In addition to this, it has been
pointed out that low income groups tend to avoid or delay
physician visits more often than high income groups
(Burström 1990; Mielck et al. 2009; Rückert et al. 2008).
However, according to Cameron et al. (1988) income
appears to be much more important in determining health
insurance choice than determining health care service use.
Similarly, van Doorslaer et al. (2002, 2004b) highlight the
positive correlation of income and private health insurance.
Research on the impact of private coverage on health care
utilization patterns is much less common, though. Based on an
analysis of the European Community Household Panel, Jones
et al. (2004) show in an international comparative study that
private insurance is positively associated with the probability
of specialist visits in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the
UK. This correlation has also been found in Switzerland
(Bisig and Gutzwiller 2004). In Germany, an impact of
private health insurance on specialist health care use could
not be confirmed yet (Andersen and Schwarze 1997;
Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995).
In the context of higher utilization levels of general medical
care by people with statutory health insurance (Andersen and
Schwarze 1997; Bergmann et al. 2005; Gruber and Kiesel
2009; Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995; Thode et al. 2005), it
seems reasonable to suppose that the latter group receives
more medical care from specialists in return and to test this
statement with current data again. Gruber and Kiesel (2009)
showed that privately insured persons have lower general
practitioner utilization than people with statutory health
insurance. Their statistical chance for at least one consulta-
tion within the last 12 months is for about two-thirds lower
than that of statutory insured persons. In addition to that, the
privately insured display lower rates of consultation if
treatment takes places. These results become more meaning-
ful by comparing them to the consultation of specialists.
Only the consideration of both general practitioners and
specialists permits evaluations about ambulant health care
inequalities depending on insurance status and other socio-
economic characteristics. Based on the assumption that the
quality of medical treatment is strongly correlated with the
number of doctor visits, substantial differences should be of
considerable interest not only for scientists but also for
political decision makers. The focus is placed on elderly
people who are characterized by high medical necessity and
growing demographic importance. The empirical analysis is
based on the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 2004. Statistical calcu-
lations have been performed with STATA v10.
First Ronald M. Andersen’s model of health care
utilization is introduced, serving as the theoretical back-
ground for the analysis. By combining the model with other
more content-based approaches, a broad overview of
important determinants of health care utilization is provid-
ed. The organizational structure of the health care system
regulates the access to health services. Therefore, we
itemize some important facts about the German health care
system. Next, the selection of variables is presented and
combined with hypotheses concerning the direction of
influence for the most important variables. In a further
step, a negative binomial hurdle regression model is
implemented to estimate the number of specialist visits.
This method has already been used for a current study of
general practitioner utilization (Gruber and Kiesel 2009).
Finally, the findings are discussed and compared to the
results of general practitioner utilization.
Conceptual frame
Ronald M. Andersen’s model of health services utilization
was first developed in the 1960s. It gives an overview of
the relevant social determinants for medical care (Andersen
and Newman 1973). Although it has been subject to
continuous sophistication in the interim (Andersen 1995),
Andersen’s original theoretical framework classifying indi-
vidual determinants into predisposing, enabling and need
still can be considered as a reference model in international
utilization research.
Andersen describes the process of health services utilization
as a causal interaction of three different levels (see Fig. 1):
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societal determinants, the health care system and individual
determinants. The societal determinants consisting of medical
technology and social norms guide and configure the health
care system. The health care system in turn allocates available
resources to care institutions and forms the organizational
framework to provide medical services. Both the societal
determinants and the health care system control the effects of
individual determinants, which are structured by the hierar-
chical trichotomy of predisposing, enabling and need.
The predisposing attributes are determined by demo-
graphic characteristics (age, sex, marital status and past
illness), the individual social structure (education, race,
family size, religion, etc.) and beliefs, values and knowl-
edge about health and medical services.
The enabling characteristics refer to specific individual
resources that affect the access to health services. Income
and the type of health insurance are the central variables in
this context. But the composition of the community (region
of country, urban or rural character, etc.) can also influence
the individual ability to visit a doctor.
The most important reason for health service utilization
is a person’s need and accordingly his/her state of health.
Andersen distinguishes between subjective experienced and
objective estimated states of health. Both do not have to be
consistent with each other.
The model offers a good theoretical frame for the
operationalization of analysis in the health care sector.
However, it is quite arbitrary with regard to contents and
hypotheses. Therefore, it is necessary to enrich the model with
substantial theory and mechanisms so that selection of
variables becomes more concrete.
Further approaches
Like other countries, Germany is affected by inequality
concerning a person’s state of health and life expectancy.
The lower the social status of a person in the society, the
higher is his/her risk of getting ill and the lower the
individual life expectancy (Mielck 2005). Following Bour-
dieu (1982), social stratum is characterized by different
patterns of thinking, cognition and evaluation, which he
called habitus. A stratum-specific habitus could influence
utilization of health services in several aspects. Differences
in trust in the health system, varying evaluations of health
risks and the grade of social proximity in doctor-patient-
relationships may correlate with social strata, thus illustrat-
ing habitus-related vertical inequality patterns. Bourdieu's
theory of capital indicates that differences in the endow-
ment with cultural capital can serve as a determinant for
different health lifestyles and socio-structural health
inequalities (Abel et al. 2006: 187).
In modern industrial nations, job-related dimensions
determine social strata (Hradil 2006: 34). Persons who
belong to the same stratum are characterized by similar
occupational status, income and education. Hradil identifies
different levels of stress and charges on the one hand as well
as different knowledge and abilities to handle these charges
on the other hand as socio-structural factors affecting the
state of health. According to him, the latter dimension is an
expression of specific health lifestyles. These lifestyles were
indeed influenced by vertical indicators of social strata, thus
corresponding to the habitus concept. However, empirical
studies show that demographic characteristics like age,
gender and family situation exert an even more important
influence on health behavior (Hradil 2006: 47; Schneider and
Spellerberg 1999). Unhealthy behavior like smoking, unbal-
anced diet, excessive consumption of alcohol and lack of
exercise appear more frequently in lower social strata
(Mielck 2005). Nevertheless, a causal model of health (care)
behavior needs to consider the impact of age-specific
experiences and identifications, gender-specific attributions
and life-cycle effects referring to a certain affinity to demand
medical care.
Breyer et al. (2005: 222) point to the problem of moral
hazard. Moral hazard means that the existence of insurance
weakens the incentive for risk-averse behavior. The costs
for health services utilization are reduced by health
insurance. Consequently, the demand for services is
expected to be higher if the insurance company covers
more costs or a broader range of costs.
Whereas moral hazard points to decisions impelled by
the patient himself, the concept of supply-induced demand
refers to medical treatment surpassing the patient’s needful
health care based on the physician’s decision (Breyer et al.
2005: 334–337). Commonly, the finding that health care
utilization increases with growing numbers of doctors in a
region is taken as an indicator for this (Andersen and
Schwarze 1997: 5; Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995: 356–357).
With increasing local density of health care suppliers,
physicians could tend to raise utilization levels unnecessar-
Societal Determinants    Health Care System 
Individual Determinants: 
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Source: Adapted from Andersen (1995) 
Fig. 1 The behavioral model of health services utilization of Ronald
M. Andersen. Source: Adapted from Andersen (1995)
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ily. Taking into account the growing competition, care
suppliers could be guided increasingly by their own financial
interests instead of patient requirements. To measure the
effects of supply-induced utilization, it is proposed to
distinguish between initial contacts to the physician, which
are patient induced, and follow-up contacts, which are mainly
doctor induced (Andersen and Schwarze 1997; Pohlmeier and
Ulrich 1995). In addition to the indicator of rising utilization
with high care provider density, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995:
357) suggest that high levels of health care use and more
follow-ups of private insurants compared to people covered
by statutory schemes could indicate supply-induced demand.
As the commissioning of services by private companies is
considerably higher than by statutory insurances, care
providers could take this as financial incentive to raise
private insurants’ treatment intensity.
Regional allocation and organizational form of the medical
institutions are not exclusively a matter of oversupply.
Sociologists emphasize potential social inequalities and
barriers of regional distinctions between urban and rural areas
as well as social gradients in the distribution of doctor offices,
which can affect the individual chance for treatment. (Geil et
al. 1997: 297; Gordala 1981: 120).
Social networks are considered to play a relevant role in
the handling of illness status (Gordala 1981: 116–118).
Persons who live in a partnership, for example, could
function as a mirror for each other's health problems. It is
supposed that social integration in networks like a family
and circle of friends has positive effects on health status.
Hence, an analysis of health care utilization should take the
individual’s close relationships and social networks into
account.
The German health care system
Information about the health system’s organizational form
is necessary to understand the causal process of the
utilization process. The following implementations refer to
regularizations existing in 2004 because this is the time of
service utilization under study.
About 90 percent of the German people are members of
the statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversi-
cherung) as compulsorily or voluntarily insured persons or
as non-contributory family members (Simon 2005). If a
person’s income exceeds the threshold for statutory health
insurance, one can choose between membership in statutory
health insurance or private health insurance (Private
Krankenversicherung). Being excluded from this rule,
public servants and the self-employed are often insured by
private companies.
Both types of health insurances differ concerning benefit
catalogs, the calculation basis for contributions, financial
incentives against unnecessary utilization and remuneration
of care providers. Members of private companies can
choose between several types of service packages and
different levels of co-payments. The statutory insurance
scheme consists of one standard benefit catalog that is
supposed to cover all necessary treatments. Benefit catalogs
of private insurants often perform equally or better in
comparison to those of statutory health funds (Busse and
Riesberg 2005: 234). However, they can even cover a
smaller range of services depending on the therapy scopes
selected, e.g., the self-employed often take out policies with
relatively high deductibles and tend to forego coverage for
all fields of care (Busse and Riesberg 2005: 95).
Contributions to the statutory health insurance are
calculated according to economic status. In contrast to that,
contributions for private insurance companies are calculated
on the basis of individual risk depending on age, sex and
past medical history. In the long run, private insurants’
contribution rates shift with respect to changing utilization
patterns.
Since 2004 the statutory health funds have been
obliged to give incentives for using primary care
physicians (Hausarztmodell). Once per quarter the statu-
tory insurant has to pay a practice fee of €10 for the first
visit of a doctor. Moreover, patients have to pay 10
percent of the price for most drugs with minimum of €5
and maximum of €10. The co-pay for hospitalization has
also been raised to €10 per day. In this context, it has to
be considered that SHARE measures utilization as contact
to doctors within the last 12 months. As data collection
was carried out between April and October 2004, it
remains unclear whether contacts have taken place before
or after the introduction of these additional fees. Members
of private insurance companies usually are free of co-pay
with respect to ambulant doctor visits. Their choice
between specialist and general practitioner consultation
is not exposed to incentives. In the medium term, private
providers reimburse all arising costs for the majority of
the insurants (who have effective coverage). However, in
the case of utilization, insurants have to advance money,
and in the long run the insurance rate is liable to increase.
If no or few services are used, a substantial part of the
paid contribution can even be refunded by the private
insurance company.
On top of full private insurance coverage, private
companies offer supplementary services that can be used
to upgrade the statutory insurance scheme. Insurants
featuring statutory plus additional private coverage will be
considered separately in the analysis.
The commissioning of doctors by health insurance
companies is a complicated process. In general, the re-
muneration for the treatment of private insurants is less
complicated and usually higher. Consequently, the incentive
354 J Public Health (2010) 18:351–365
for doctor-induced health services utilization is larger for
members of private insurance companies.
Methods
Population and sampling
The data that we use for analyzing specialist consultation
is the German part of the first wave of the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in
2004 [for methodological details, see Börsch-Supan and
Jürges (2005); Börsch-Supan et al. (2005) give an intro-
duction to the survey contents]. The survey comprises
representative information on health and socioeconomic
status as well as on the social and familial situation of the
elderly and is well accepted by the international research
community (Allin et al. 2009; Bolin et al. 2007; Kohli et al.
2009; Mielck et al. 2009). SHARE covers persons 50 years
old or older and their partners who were surveyed
independent of their age. To allow for inferences to a
population of older individuals we exclude persons less
than 50 years old from our sample. Furthermore, we do not
take into account people older than 90 years and the highest
and lowest percentile of the household gross income
distribution in order to eliminate statistical outliers from
the analysis. Sample heterogeneity because of extreme
groups or cases, like people over 90 years often being
characterized by highly intensive health care use, or people
of extremely high or low income, could affect the efficiency
of the statistical estimation process. Therefore, we have
decided to leave these cases out for the purpose of reaching
a more homogeneous dataset. As we aim to analyze the
effect of private insurance on specialist visits, people
without explicit insurance coverage for ambulant treatment
are ignored as well. Finally, we include only persons with
former or current labor market activity to estimate the effect
of occupational group on health care provision.
Our sample size of 2,260 is based on all cases with
complete data concerning the variables used in the
multivariate analysis. In consideration of gender-specific
health behavior (Thode et al. 2005: 304), morbidity
(Schellhorn 2003: 23) and health service supply, e.g.,
gynecology and urology, we examine different samples
for men (n=1,071) and women (n=1,189). A descriptive
examination investigating the impact of the case by case
exclusion of missing values shows that the distribution of
values only changed marginally in the sample, except
men’s health care need, which increased between 3.5 and
10 percent per indicator compared to the population before
the case exclusion. As we will not interpret the coefficients
of health status, we assume no further negative impact on
our estimators by excluding the cases with missing values.
Table 1 lists the variables used to explain the number of
specialist visits within the last year as proxy for medical
specialist care. The table displays either percentage and
absolute number to characterize binary variables or mean
and standard deviation in case of metric variables.
Operationalization
We categorize health insurance into three different types:
(1) statutory health insurance without any private coverage
for outpatient treatment, (2) statutory health insurance with
voluntary supplementary private insurance for ambulant
treatment and (3) complete private coverage including
ambulant care. The SHARE study provides information
about the particular scope of statutory and private insurance
schemes. According to our definition, additional private
insurance means that coverage is used at least for one of the
fields of specialist treatment, free choice of doctors or no
co-payments for drugs. Similarly, fully privately insured
persons will have coverage including direct access to
specialist treatment, free choice of doctors or no co-
payments for drugs.
In our sample 81 percent of men and 86 percent of
women are solely associated with the statutory health
insurance and do not hold any private coverage for
outpatient treatment. Additionally to the statutory scheme,
5 percent of each subsample takes out voluntary add-on
insurance for ambulant care to improve their health
services. Fourteen percent male and 9 percent female
respondents have their health insurance including ambulant
services entirely from private providers.
We will use the degree of urbanization as a variable to
approximate the distribution of health care institutions. The
specification of regions as village, small town, large town,
suburbs or city is assessed by the interviewer. Moreover, we
control for the lower doctor density in Eastern Germany
(Weber 2005).
The financial resources of households indicate their
capability to afford costly treatments that are not covered
by the insurance. Income will be considered as the
household gross equivalence income according to the
OECD. We use the “OECD-modified equivalence scale,”
which assigns a weight of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to
each additional adult member and 0.3 to each child
(Hagenaars et al. 1994; OECD 2009).
The level of formal education, a proxy for health lifestyle,
is operationalized as years of education. In wave 1 of SHARE,
the years of education are not asked directly, but are derived
from ISCED-97 categories (Mannheim Research Institute for
the Economics of Aging 2009: 22; information on ISCED-97
in: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization 2006; Mannheim Research Institute for the
Economics of Aging 2007: 6).
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– Lower secondary education or the second stage of basic
education is coded as 10 years of schooling (“Volks-
oder Hauptschulabschluss,” “Realschulabschluss”).
– (Upper) secondary education is coded as 12 years
(“Fachhochschulreife”) or 13 years of education
(“Abitur,” “Haupt-oder Realschulabschluss mit Lehre
oder Berufsfachschule”).
– Post-secondary non-tertiary education is coded as
16 years of formal education (“Fachhochschulreife
oder Abitur mit Lehre oder Berufsfachschule”).
Table 1 Sample description: explanatory variables
Explanatory variables Percentagea/meanb (Men: n=1,071) Percentagea/meanb (Women: n=1,189)
Health insurance
Statutory (ref.) 81% (870) 86% (1,022)
Statutory + ambulant 5% (55) 5% (64)
Private incl. amb. 14% (146) 9% (103)
Sociodemography
Income 31,486 (29,102) 29,970 (29,261)
Years of education 14.20 (2.54) 12.97 (2.72)
Partner 83% (891) 70% (828)
Born not in G 19% (207) 19% (220)
Age 64.27 (8.75) 64.25 (9.55)
Employment
Employed (ref.) 31% (337) 28% (330)
Retired 59% (627) 53% (633)
Disabled 4% (39) 2% (20)
Unemployed 6% (66) 4% (48)
Homemaker 0% (2) 13% (158)
Blue/white collar (ref.) 79% (847) 90% (1,071)
Civil servant 11% (122) 4% (44)
Self-employed 10% (102) 6% (74)
Region
New Laender 17% (179) 20% (232)
Big city 17% (179) 15% (184)
Suburbs 12% (124) 11% (125)
Large town 12% (131) 13% (150)
Small town 28% (305) 31% (372)
Village (ref.) 31% (332) 30% (358)
Health status
Support 13% (137) 17% (204)
Chronic conditions 61% (651) 61% (724)
Cardiovascular risk factors 0.70 (0.81) 0.68 (0.80)
Lung 0.09 (0.32) 0.07 (0.29)
Cardiovascular disease 0.21 (0.45) 0.12 (0.35)
Musculoskeletal 0.14 (0.36) 0.26 (0.48)
Cancer 6% (68) 7% (79)
Stomach 7% (73) 6% (68)
Pain 0.65 (0.64) 0.75 (0.66)
Respiratory 0.28 (0.58) 0.25 (0.56)
Faint 0.13 (0.41) 0.24 (0.53)
Legs 7% (78) 17% (202)
Sleep 16% (170) 25% (293)
Incontinence 3% (34) 4% (51)
a Percentages are displayed for categorical variables, absolute numbers in parentheses; b means are displayed for metric variables, standard deviation in
parentheses
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– The first stage of tertiary education is coded as 16.5 years
(“Fachschulabschluss”), 17 years (“Fachhochschulabs-
chluss”) or 18 years of schooling (Hochschulabschluss).
We differentiate among self-employed, civil servants and
blue or white collar workers in order to account for their
varying institutional access to health insurance schemes and
their specific employment situations. As more than half of
the persons from our two particular samples are retired,
these occupational indicators relate to current or former
positions in the labor market.
The transition to retirement is an important change in life
that might affect health behavior. Hence, we integrate the
variable employment status indicating the values retired and
employed. The residual values disabled, unemployed and
homemaker will not be of interest for the interpretation.
Close social relationships facilitate the perception of and
coping with illness. Thus, we incorporate an indicator for
partnership in the statistical model. Possible migration-
specific socio-cultural characteristics are controlled for by
the dummy variable born in Germany. Similarly to retire-
ment, age could stand for gradually changing health attitudes.
The most immediate determinant of utilization is
certainly the health status. For this, SHARE provides a
rich set of objective health indicators. On account of
multidimensionality and high information loss, we do not
generate a sole morbidity index. We rather pool particular
binary indicators to two- or three-stage sum scores referring
to a principal component analysis and content-related
plausibility. Thereby, the different health dimensions are
preserved for multivariate analysis. The aim of this strategy
is not to interpret the resulting need coefficients, but to
balance the sample population by health status in an
accurate way so that the predisposing and enabling effects
are not affected by morbidity anymore. We consider the
following variables to control for health care need:
(1) support: in need of support concerning daily activities
(dummy),
(2) chronic conditions: long-term health problems, disease
or handicap (dummy),
(3) cardiovascular risk factors: sum score of “high blood
pressure,” “high blood cholesterol” and “diabetes,”
(4) lung: sum score of “chronic lung disease” and
“asthma,”
(5) cardiovascular disease: sum score of “heart attack or
other heart problems” and “stroke or cerebral vascu-
lar disease,”
(6) musculoskeletal: sum score of “arthritis or rheuma-
tism” and “osteoporosis,”
(7) cancer: cancer or malignant tumor (dummy),
(8) stomach: stomach, duodenal or peptic ulcer (dummy),
(9) pain: sum score of “pain in neck, knees, hips or other
joint” and “stomach or intestinal problems,”
(10) respiratory: sum score of “heart trouble,” “breath-
lessness” and “persistent cough,”
(11) faint: sum score of “falling down,” “fear of falling
down” and “dizziness, faints, blackouts,”
(12) legs: swollen legs (dummy),
(13) sleep: sleeping problems (dummy),
(14) incontinence (dummy).
Hypotheses
As outlined in the section about the German Health Care
System, both statutory and private health insurance
schemes comprise particular terms and conditions affecting
the level of health care utilization. Add-on insurances are
considered as a weakened form of the depicted private
scheme so that arguments can be applied in a similar
manner. Taking all aspects of insurance-specific incentives
into account, the theoretical effect is inconclusive, and
empirical evidence is needed to reach clarification.
The modeling strategy will allow to distinguish general
attachment to the sector of specialist medicine from the
level of utilization in case of treatment. In case of insur-
ance, the former effect mainly referring to patients’
decisions could contain information about moral hazard.
However, differences in attachment probabilities may
derive either from oversupply or from undersupply, making
an interpretation difficult. Differences in the level of health
care utilization if treatment takes place could come from
doctor decision and thus indicate supply-induced demand.
Indeed, the latter could also be a consequence of different
benefit catalogs. A higher level of doctor concentration that
is accompanied by increasing utilization might also indicate
supply-induced demand.
Because health insurance covers almost all costs of
health care utilization, income is expected to show no
substantial effect. It serves rather as an indicator for social
stratum. Theoretically more strongly associated with social
stratum on the one side and social milieu on the other side
should be the level of formal education. It is supposed to be
connected positively with health lifestyle and knowledge
about symptoms and the health care system. Thus, a
positive effect of education is expected, which has already
been confirmed for most of the Western European countries
and the USA (Bisig and Gutzwiller 2004: 73; Van Door-
slaer et al. 2000).
Riphahn et al. (2002: 20) point to the fact that the self-
employed suffer income losses as a consequence of doctor
visits in contrast to employees. Therefore, we expect a
lower level of medical care utilization compared to em-
ployees or workers. On the other hand, we anticipate that
the group of civil servants indicates a relatively high level
of utilization because of the high job security.
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Furthermore, we suppose that retirement has a positive
effect on health care because the temporal commitment
to the employment market disappears and people have
more free time at their disposal. Retirement could also
influence health lifestyles positively as this late period of
life is generally connected with frailness and as “time to
care for one’s health.” We state an analogue life-cycle
effect for the aging process that could stand for gradually
changing health attitudes and increasing affinity to health
issues. Hence, the age coefficient should not merely
represent morbidity, which will be controlled for in
detail.
In addition to the suggested main effects, we will
investigate interactions between health insurance, occupa-
tional status, employment status and age:
a. Differences in utilization concerning the occupational
status (blue-/white collar, civil servant, self-employed)
during employment are expected to disappear in
retirement as the specific job characteristics disappear.
Gruber and Kiesel (2009) showed that the general
practitioner utilization of self-employed rises to the
level of employees in retirement.
b. Furthermore, we suppose an intensification of insurance-
specific utilization patterns in retirement compared to
employment as a consequence of increasing free time
and life-cycle effects. As the number of private
insurants’ general practitioner consultation decreases in
retirement (Gruber and Kiesel 2009), we assume that
they instead increase their specialist utilization in
comparison to public insurants.
c. As the mode of private insurance often varies between
occupational groups (see above), we expect on the one
hand a relatively low utilization level of privately
covered self-employed having high deductibles and on
the other hand a relatively high utilization level of
privately covered civil servants.
d. Finally, we introduce an interaction of age and
retirement, which results in estimating two different
age effects with particular slopes for the employed
and the retired. This means reciprocally that the
retirement effect can differ with age. This modeling
strategy is based on the assumption that we are
confronted with two differing life-cycle stages with
varying subjective importance of health issues.
Statistical model
Estimating the number of doctor visits is a classical field for
the application of count data regression models (Cameron et
al. 1988; Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Count data are able to
exploit the specific information of a positive discrete variable
with right skewed distribution, which is the case for our
dependent variable number of specialist visits within the last
12 months in the sample distribution for both men and
women.
Standard models to estimate count variables are the
Poisson regression and the negative binomial regression.
These models imply that there is one single process
generating the number of doctor visits. However,
referring to principal agent theory, it was suggested to
assume two theoretically different processes that are
responsible for the outcome in the field of health care
utilization (Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Pohlmeier and
Ulrich 1995; Andersen and Schwarze 1997): first, the
demand-induced initial consultation and second, the
demand- as well as supply-induced following contacts.
Because only the latter process—the decision for further
contacts—is affected by doctor influence, standard models
would lead to misspecification. Compared to recently
suggested latent class models (Deb and Trivedi 1997;
Bago d'Uva 2006), which act rather inductively, hurdle
models are derived from substantive theoretical consid-
eration and can be estimated more easily. It has been
pointed out, though, that the interpretation of hurdle
models in terms of principal agent theory depends on
identification of illness spells. Indeed, we cannot be sure
that only single and uncensored episodes exist in our
data base, but hurdle models can be theoretically
meaningful nevertheless. As they indicate in the first
step whether the health care sector is generally utilized
or not, which always refers to the individual, we still
assume theoretical validity. However, the strict differen-
tiation between the effects of the first and second step
coefficients could be weakened.
The estimation of hurdle models is two-part: first, the
probability to have contact to medical specialist at all—to
take the hurdle—is computed reflecting the patient’s deci-
sion, and second, the number of specialist visits in case of
utilization is computed reflecting also doctor influence. We
will estimate the first process as logistic regression and the
latter as zero truncated negative binomial regression
(ZTNB); other models can also be implemented (for detailed
information: Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long and Freese
2006).
The probability π of zero consultation is only estimated
in the logistic model. The probability of a number of
specialist visits higher than zero results from the zero
truncated negative binomial model, which is weighted by
the probability of taking the hurdle (1−π):
Pr y ¼ 0jxð Þ ¼ p ð1Þ
Pr yjxð Þ ¼ 1 pð ÞPr yjy > 0; xð Þfor y > 0 ð2Þ
358 J Public Health (2010) 18:351–365
The expected number of specialist consultations results
from the conditional mean of the zero truncated model,
which is weighted by the probability of utilizing ambulant
specialist health care in general:
E yjxð Þ ¼ ð1 pÞE yjy > 0; xð Þ ð3Þ
Results
Table 2 shows the first results of the multivariate estimation
of the number of specialist visits by gender. In each case
two rows of coefficients are calculated. The first row shows
logit coefficients, which indicate the change of the
logarithmized probability to utilize ambulant specialist
Negative binomial-logit hurdle regression
Specialist visits Men Women
Logita ZTNBb Logita ZTNBb
Public + ambulant 0.169 0.506** 0.085 0.174
Private incl. amb. −0.062 0.668*** 0.560* −0.015
Civil servant 0.231 −0.121 −0.291 0.307
Self-employed −0.285 −0.470** −0.476* −0.184
Log_income c 0.130 −0.088 0.215** −0.045
Education (centered) 0.095*** −0.001 0.051* 0.006
Partner 0.221 −0.041 0.477*** 0.045
Born not in G 0.115 −0.382*** 0.019 0.030
Age_c (centered) 0.055** 0.070*** 0.011 −0.008
Retired*Age_c −0.066** −0.077*** −0.039* 0.012
Retired −0.407 −0.488** −0.203 0.101
Disabled −0.412 0.275 0.058 −0.261
Unemployed 0.742 0.017 0.860 1.360***
Homemaker −1.146 2.550*** −0.179 0.441**
New Laender 0.230 −0.032 −0.175 −0.195
Big city 0.107 0.441*** 0.654*** 0.030
Suburbs 0.110 0.447*** 0.243 0.299
Large town 0.086 0.467*** −0.149 0.061
Small town −0.367* 0.143 0.205 0.244*
Support −0.113 0.243* −0.099 0.226
Chronic conditions 0.526*** 0.572*** 0.202 0.463***
Cardiovascular risk factors (sum score) 0.010 −0.089* −0.102 −0.080
Lung (sum score) 0.205 −0.234* 0.165 0.335*
Cardiovascular disease (sum score) 0.655*** 0.050 0.294 0.418*
Musculoskeletal (sum score) 0.563** 0.099 0.406** 0.303***
Cancer 1.411*** 0.298* 0.241 0.866***
Stomach 0.350 0.016 0.386 −0.178
Pain (sum score) 0.499*** 0.103 0.284** 0.011
Respiratory (sum score) −0.060 −0.065 0.225 −0.116
Faint (sum score) 0.114 0.049 −0.030 0.018
Legs −0.0446 0.280 −0.036 0.235
Sleep 0.188 0.390*** 0.210 0.095
Incontinence −0.142 0.783*** −0.324 0.371
Constant −1.963** 1.752** −2.127** 0.530
Ln alpha d −0.397*** 0.411*
BIC e 3.31e+07 3.31e+07 4.67e+07 4.67e+07
n 1071 1071 1189 1189
Table 2 Results of the main
models
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a Logit coefficients indicate the
change of logarithmized
probability to utilize ambulant
specialist health care if the
independent variable increases by
one unit; b ZTNB coefficients
indicate the positive or negative
influence of the independent
variables on the number of
doctor visits in case of general
utilization; c natural logarithm of
income; d dispersion parameter
of negative binomial regression;
e Bayesian information criterion=
−2*ln(likelihood)+ln(n)*k
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health care if the independent variable increases by one
unit. Odds ratios are obtained by calculating the exponent.
The second row displays the positive or negative influence
of the independent variables on the number of doctor visits
in case of general utilization. Here, one has to bear in mind
that the estimates from the ZTNB must not be interpreted in
a numerical way as factor changes like in the standard
Poisson or negative binomial regression, but only direc-
tionally as positive or negative correlation (Long and
Freese 2006: 384-385, 389).
On the one hand, it appears that the general probability
of specialist utilization does not seem to differ between
insurance groups. The positive effect of privately insured
women is just slightly significant. On the other hand, we
find a strong positive effect of the treatment intensity for
both supplementary and fully privately insured men.
Civil servants do not seem to have a higher consultation
rate than blue or white collar workers in spite of their
reliable employment situation. Again, women’s differences
are less significant.
Whereas income does not seem to affect men’s consul-
tation probability, financial resources exert a significant
influence on women’s attachment to specialist health care.
The significant (men) and respectively slightly significant
(women) logit coefficients indicate that highly educated
people use the specialist health care sector to a greater extent
than less educated people. According to the estimation, the
probability of men’s utilization increases about 10 percent for
every additional year of education. Similarly to insurance and
employment status, education level plays a much more
important role for men than for women.
Partnership turns out to have great explanatory power
concerning women’s specialist health care. Women living
with a partner in the same household have a significantly
higher probability of using specialist health care (about 60
percent).
Men who are not born in Germany have a significantly
lower number of specialist visits than men born in
Germany, although they do not differ as to their general
attachment to the specialist care system.
Women’s specialist health care does not vary signifi-
cantly by age or between the employed and retired. Effects
of aging and retirement also turn out to be insignificant
even if morbidity is not controlled for (result not shown).
This indicates that elderly women display a relatively
constant level of specialist care utilization.
In contrast, men are characterized by significant age
coefficients in both stages. Employed men, thus male
sample members aged between 50 and 65 years, show a
positive aging effect. In retirement, the aging process
Negative binomial-logit hurdle regression
Specialist visits Men Women
Logit a ZTNB b Logit a ZTNB b
Public + ambulant 0.169 0.399* 0.094 0.171
Private incl. amb. −0.095 1.189*** 0.121 −0.002
Civil servant 0.195 −0.212 0.489 0.363
Self-employed −0.022 −0.756** −0.437 −0.181
Ln_incomec 0.114 −0.017 0.219** −0.041
Education (centered) 0.095*** −0.006 0.053* 0.002
Age_c (centered) 0.053** 0.069*** 0.013 −0.008
Retired*age_c −0.063** −0.080*** −0.040* 0.012
Retired −0.364 −0.425* −0.213 0.118
Retired * civil servant −1.901* −0.193
Retired * self-employed −0.538 1.076***
Retired * public+amb.
Retired * private incl.amb. 0.139 −0.585** 1.212* −0.049
Public+amb. * self-employed
Private incl.amb. * self-employed −0.178 −1.155**
Control variablesd d d d d
Constant −1.853** 0.995 −2.157** 0.488
Ln alphae −0.469*** 0.409*
BICf 3.30e+07 3.30e+07 4.67e+07 4.67e+07
n 1071 1071 1189 1189
Table 3 Results of the
interaction models
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a Logit coefficients indicate
the change of logarithmized
probability to utilize ambulant
specialist health care if the
independent variable increases
by one unit; b ZTNB coefficients
indicate the positive or negative
influence of the independent
variables on the number of
doctor visits in case of general
utilization;c natural logarithm of
income; d control variables not
mentioned: partner, not born in
Germany, disabled, unemployed,
homemaker, regional variables,
health variables (cf. Table 2);
e dispersion parameter of negative
binomial regression; f Bayesian
information criterion=−2
* ln(likelihood)+ln(n)*k; main
and corresponding interaction
effects are framed when they both
are significant
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adopts a negative sign (0.055 – 0.066=−0.011 respectively
0.070–0.077=−0.007). Moreover, retired men are charac-
terized by overall lower treatment intensity than employed
men. Interestingly, the age coefficient remains slightly
positive in retirement when morbidity is not controlled for
(result not shown), which suggests a constant increase in
health care need because of morbidity in older ages.
The remaining variables concerning employment status
are not interpreted because we did not focus on them
theoretically.
Differences in specialist health care between Eastern and
Western Germany do not occur. However, we find
significant regional coefficients indicating a positive corre-
lation of specialist consultation level and grade of urban-
ization. Particularly men living in big cites, suburbs or large
towns are characterized by higher utilization compared to
men living in rural areas or villages.
The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is a popular
measure for comparing maximum likelihood models. As
the model with the smaller value of the information
criterion is considered to be better, we conclude that the
explanatory variables used in the equations to explain
specialist health care are more suitable to men than to
women. Men’s utilization seems to be more sensitive
concerning predisposing and enabling conditions.
In the next step we would like to test for the interaction
terms a, b and c (see above; interaction d already belongs to
the main specification). Initially, all six interaction variables
indented in Table 3 have been included in the main model.
Then, only the variables with significant coefficients have
remained in each specification, and the estimation has been
repeated. Thus, interaction terms are included according to
their gender-specific explanatory power. On the one hand,
the interaction effects in the female sample cannot be
interpreted because they are only slightly significant and
the accessory main effects remain insignificant. On the
other hand, we find strong evidence supporting interactions
for men in the second step equation: first, the utilization
level of the self-employed differs in employment status.
Their number of specialist visits is higher within the group
of retired than within the group of employed. Second, the
privately insured in retirement display a lower consultation
rate compared to privately insured in employment. As we
control for morbidity, this effect may reflect the decreasing
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Men ’ s number of specialist consultation
Fig. 2 Conditional expected means of men’s specialist consultation within the last 12 months
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numbers of preventive examinations in older ages. Third,
specialist care utilization differs to a larger extent between
the self-employed and employees covered by private health
insurance than between self-employed and employees
covered by statutory health insurance.
To illustrate theoretically important differences among
groups, we calculate conditional expected means according
to formula 3 (see above). Referring to the main model in
Table 2, Fig. 2 displays the expected number of specialist
visits of male sample members having on the one side
different values of education, insurance, age and employ-
ment status and on the other mean values concerning the
other sample characteristics. As STATA v10 does not
calculate confidence intervals of conditional means from
truncated negative binomial regression, figs. 2 and 3 do not
contain information about significance.
The age ranges from 50 to 65 concerning the employed
and from 50 to 90 concerning the retired. The vertical line
at age 65 represents the regular pension start in Germany. It
becomes apparent that men’s utilization is stratified by
insurance: Privately covered insurants show higher health
care use than those covered by the statutory scheme.
Moreover, these insurance groups are themselves internally
differentiated by education.
Similarly, referring to the model in Table 3, Fig. 3
illustrates the role of the interaction of occupational status,
insurance and employment status. Again, the privately
insured display generally higher numbers of specialist visits
than those covered by statutory insurance. In case of
employment, these insurance specific patterns are internally
stratified by occupational class: The self-employed show
lower levels of utilization than employees—independent of
their insurance scheme. If we look at these groups in case
of retirement, there is no further difference related to
occupational status within the group covered by statutory
insurance.
Discussion
The empirical analysis shows that the process of health care
utilization differs significantly between men and women.
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Fig. 3 Conditional expected means of men’s specialist consultation within the last 12 months
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Whereas men’s number of specialist visits is markedly
sensitive to predisposing and enabling factors, women’s
health care utilization depends less on such socioeconomic
characteristics. However, financial resources and partner-
ship are conditions that are significantly associated with
women’s number of specialist consultation.
As differences by insurance status for the whole
population cannot be found, there is no empirical evidence
supporting the general thesis of supply-induced demand or
moral hazard due to insurance. However, we find a strong
positive effect of the treatment intensity for both supple-
mentary and fully private insured men. Having a relatively
low basic level of health care use, supply-induced demand
might be more relevant to men than to women because of
more opportunities to raise their treatment intensity. The
assumption of a bipolar health care system providing
general practitioner care primarily to the statutory insured
(Gruber and Kiesel 2009) and specialist care to the
privately insured is supported empirically as to men. This
structural inequality in health service provision should be
considered further in the field of health system research and
health policy.
In addition to inequality due to insurance status, we
maintain that ambulant health care provision is stratified by
educational attainment. Education, which is considered to
be highly correlated with healthy lifestyles and knowledge
to exhaust benefit catalogs, does indeed matter to utiliza-
tion, be it general practitioner care (Gruber and Kiesel
2009) or specialist care. Thus, we support the thesis of an
educational gradient in the German health care system.
Besides, the composition of ambulant health care varies
with a regional gradient: while general practitioner consul-
tation is more common in rural regions (Gruber and Kiesel
2009), the utilization of medical specialist care increases
with the degree of urbanization. This might be taken as
evidence for supply-induced effects.
As the lower probability for the self-employed to consult
a specialist can only be confirmed in case of employment,
the hypothesis of their disadvantageous employment situ-
ation affecting health care use in a negative way is
supported empirically. We do not find differences between
the self-employed and employees in case of retirement,
which has also been indicated by the analysis of general
practitioner utilization (Gruber and Kiesel 2009).
Finally, self-employed people with private health
insurance seem to have a rather unfavorable insurance
coverage because of comparatively high deductibles and
partly restricted scopes of coverage. As under the
statutory scheme differences between the self-employed
and employees cease in retirement, the privately insured
self-employed maintain their relatively low level of
specialist consultation that they display likewise in
employment.
Our analyses show the existence of significant differ-
ences in the extent of specialist consultation between
socioeconomic groups. Based on the applied research
method, though, it is not possible to make a statement
about the absolute level and adequacy of the varying
utilization patterns. Further studies could concentrate on the
question whether these findings of horizontal inequity
indicate rather overprovision or underprovision of ambulant
health care in Germany. From our point of view, only very
specific quantitative research focusing on one single
treatment, a homogenous group of therapies, or qualitative
research capturing the complexity of health care demand is
able to produce concrete evidence.
Moreover, we recommend longitudinal research that is
particularly suited to detangle age and cohort effects. Cross-
sectional data either allow to estimate the impact of cohorts
or to quantify age effects because the two variables are
completely collinear. However, it is of particular interest to
investigate how the aging process develops over different
birth cohorts. In longitudinal data, different birth cohorts for
the same age can be identified that enables the estimation of
both effects.
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